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KWARI REPORT 2

Address at National Press Club A Requisite for a Solution to the Korean Peninsula's Issue : The Recovery of Human Rights
-An Appeal for a Solution of the Issue of Korean War Abductees

Author   : Lee Mi-Il
Publisher : Korean War Abduction Research Institute

Introduction
A short trip to Washington, DC

KWARI Report II is published just before the upcoming 17th Korean presidential election. Election season in Korea is interesting in many ways. Good governance can solve problems, unburden its people, and heals the brokenhearted. I wish this "good governance" would be given us as a blessing. Bad governance in the past brought about the Korean War abduction issue, but it has never been resolved although it caused a deeply graved wound. The gnawing pain is still going on even at this moment.

Probably I am wrong to wish for the complete resolution for this matter. Even if there were no such perfect solution for the Korean War abduction issues nevertheless, it is the government's responsibility to step forward to solve the problem by investigating cases and persecuting the perpetrators. In 2007, the President of South Korea proposed "Declaration of a Formal End of Korean War" and "Establishment of a Peace Regime between two Koreas" as a solution for peace on the Korean peninsula. He suggested that since the Cold War was over in the world, now it is time to end the war between North and South Korea as well. Also, he state that two Koreas should not have an armistice but a peace regime which recognizes each other's systems. His proposals sound convincing at the first glance.

There is, however, no realistic diagnosis (analysis) on the question why this "simple common premise" is not applicable to North and South Korea. The truth lies where it is absurd to declare the end of the war which is still ongoing and to insist that a glimmer of peace is seen where the true peace has never been even close. (or a peace is here when the peace has never came.) If the war were formally concluded, the abductees during the war must have been repatriated; if such a peace existed, the peace-breaker should have apologized for breaking the peace and have taken punishment.

KWARI's Washington visit (July 19-28, 2007) let me realize that there is no need of time-consuming arguments about the "common sense" with Washingtonians. U.S. Government officials (anonymous) remarked, "The goal of the Six Party Talks includes normalization of North Korea. It is impossible to normalize North Korea without improving their human rights conditions, and the Korean War abduction issue should be brought in along with this line of normalization framework." Furthermore, another officer encouraged KWARI's movements by noting, "A Peace Treaty can be outcome of the Six Party Talks," and "Since we have not achieved nonproliferation of North Korea, it is too early to discuss a Peace Treaty as a product of the Six Party Talks. But it is the right timing to alarm and bring up this issue on human rights of civilian abductees during the war on the table."

A Congressman, who is an expert on Korean issues, remarked at the in-person meeting, "Trade and security is the key issues for the U.S.-Republic of Korea Interparlimentary Exchange (USROKIE) (or for the US and Korean members of Congress). It is possible for us to support the Korean War abduction issue within the "security" framework."

Other visits on various think tanks and media reaffirmed that there exists "Washington Consensus" on the Korean War abduction issues. Who could argue with the fact (deny the fact) that the US cares about the inherent values—"forcibly separated families must be reunified, and unjustly imprisoned (detained, persecuted, confined) victims must be sent free"— not only because the US played a key role in the Korean War, but because the US believes in the certain inherent values.

If North Korea's "bad governance" blocks this, there would not be any peace unless North Korea repents. Nevertheless, if South Korea keeps alleging peace, it is obvious to see that South Korea's governance would become part of the bad governance. KWARI's speech at the National Press Club in this report warns about this unavoidable consequence. It was supernatural (I do not want to use this term, would "a kind of" or mysterious, or "providence out of our control"? be better?) providence which enabled us to make this speech. KWARI, as a small Non-Profit Organization, was overwhelmed to have had an opportunity to speak about "Prerequisites for a Peace Treaty" a month before the former Korean President KIM Dae-jung urged the US' support for a Peace Treaty in the Korean Peninsula at the same place.

The Annex of KWARI Report II also includes a letter to the countries which participated and sacrificed their lives in the Korean War. This letter reminds that not only blood of Koreans but also so much innocent blood of other countries, who fought only for justice and liberty, was shed in the Korean War. Towards these efforts of KWARI stated above, North Korea gets irritated and reacts very sensitively. North Korea criticized KWARI vigorously through various media channels to discourage us. By revealing North Korea's criticism in the Annex II, we pass readers (or you?) the role to determine which is the truth.
Contents
4 Foreword / A short trip to Washington D.C.


9 SPECIAL / Address at National Press Club

A Prerequisite for a Solution to the Korean Peninsula's Issue:
The Recovery of Human Rights
- An Appeal for a Solution of the Issue of Korean War Abductees


25 Historical Materials /

Additional materials providing information about the figure of South Korean civilians abducted to North Korea
* Telegram that Ambassador Muccio received from CINCUNC Advance dated Dec. 23, 1951
* Telegram that Ambassador Muccio sent to CINCUNC Advance dated Dec. 24, 1951
* Telegram that Ambassador Muccio sent to CINCUNC Advance dated Jan. 4, 1952
* Telegram that Ambassador Muccio sent to the US State Department dated
Dec. 5, 1951
Documents regarding the official U.S. position on the issue of South Korean civilians abducted to North Korea to be discussed at the Korean War armistice negotiation
* Telegram by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State dated Dec. 5, 1951
* Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McCurkin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) ¡²Washington,¡³dated Dec. 11, 1951
* Telegram by the Commander in chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated Dec. 12, 1951


39 Article

A memo from Pyongyang Prison (Chosun Daily, Sept. 29, 2007)


45 Appendix ¥°

KWAFU's letter to the countries that participated in the Korean War


53 Appendix ¥±

DPRK's Response to the Activities of KWAFU and KWARI

Sep. 1, 2007 , Statement of a Spokesman for the National Reconciliation Council, "¡¶Resolution on the Korean War Abduction¡·, Proposal of this Bill before the U.S. Congress Is Political Provocation

Aug. 31, 2007 www.uriminzokkiri.com, DPRK Committee of Peaceful Reunification
"Such Despicable Farce Staged by Human Scum"

Sep. 5. 2006. "Unacceptable anti-DPRK smear campaign"
Glimpse
This report contains the contents of a speech made to the National Press Club (NPC) in Washington, D.C., on July 26, 2007, one day before the anniversary of the signing of the Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. The speech argues that the human rights issues surrounding Korean War abductees, a long-standing and unresolved issue from the armistice negotiations, must be discussed first before talk of establishing a "peace regime" or announcing a "statement ending the war."
The letter in Appendix 1 was sent to the countries that participated in the Korean War. It first expresses gratitude to all those across the world that fought for freedom and justice in the war and then asks for their help in spreading the truth about North Korea's campaign of criminal abductions during the conflict. The declassified top-secret U.S. government document also included here reveals that U.S. officials proposed that the repatriation of war-time abductees be dealt with at a later time if there was no progress on the issue during the armistice negotiations.